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Two QKD protocols with limited classical Bob who is restricted to only preparing a qubit in
the classical basis and sending it or doing nothing are presented, and they are proved completely
robust. As limited classical Bob can deterministically prepare the qubit, we exploit this feature to
construct a quantum secure direct communication protocol with limited classical Bob, which is the
direct communication of secret messages without first producing a shared secret key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard
(BB84) [1], quantum key distribution (QKD) has been
developed quickly and has started approaching matu-
rity, ready for implementation in realistic setting [2].
QKD mainly realizes the transmission of secret messages,
which is an important task in cryptography; and the se-
curity of the QKD does not depend on the intractabil-
ity of mathematical task, which can be solved efficiently
if quantum computer could be available someday, but
the general principles of quantum mechanics. The quan-
tum mechanics can guarantee the security of the pro-
tocols without imposing any restriction of the power of
the eavesdropper. However, previous quantum key dis-
tribution protocols require all parties to have quantum
capabilities which may be unpractical in various applica-
tions because not all the participants can afford expen-
sive quantum resources and quantum operations. So the
question of how ”quantum” a protocol should be in order
to achieve a significant advantage over all classical proto-
col is of great interest [3]. In 2007, Boyer et al. presented,
for the first time, a protocol in which one party (Bob) is
classical [3] to answer this question in the field of quan-
tum cryptography. We call such a protocol BKM2007
for short. This ”semi-quantum” protocol has advantages
over fully quantum protocol because it is easier to im-
plement in practice, and maintains all the advantages of
the original system. Now, there have been some of the
results in the area of semi-quantum protocols [4–6].
The setting of BKM2007 is as follow [3]: Alice and Bob
have labs that are perfectly secure; they use qubits for
their quantum communication; they have access to an
authenticated public classical communication channel; a
quantum channel leads from Alice’s lab to the outside
world and back to her lab; Bob can access a segment of
the channel, and whenever a qubit passes through that
segment Bob can either let it go undisturbed or (1) mea-
sure the qubit in the fixed orthogonal basis set {|0〉, |1〉}
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which is also called classical, and (2) prepare a (fresh)
qubit in the classical basis and send it. Bob is classi-
cal if he is limited to performing only operations (1) and
(2) or doing nothing, and he cannot obtain any quantum
superposition of the two states in the classical basis.
To answer the question of how ”quantum” a protocol
should be in order to achieve a significant advantage over
all classical protocol. It is natural to ask whether there
exists a high-secure protocol in which classical Bob is lim-
ited to perform only operation (2) or do nothing, we call
such Bob limited classical Bob for convenience. There are
four reasons why we consider the limited classical Bob.
First of all, it gives an answer to the question of how
”quantum” a protocol should be in order to achieve a
significant over all classical protocol. Second, not all the
participants can afford expensive quantum operations,
for example, measuring the quantum qubits using qubit
detector. So the protocol with limited classical Bob may
be more practical in various applications. Third, in prin-
ciple, quantum key distribution offers unconditional secu-
rity where assumptions are made for the devices involved.
However, in practical implementations the components
deviate from the models in the security proofs. Eve could
exploit imperfections in Alice’s or Bob’s equipment (such
as source or detectors) remotely to acquire their secret
key. Several such attacks have been proposed [8, 9]. Re-
cently, it has been experimentally shown that the detec-
tors of two commercially available QKD systems can be
fully remote-controlled using specially tailored bright il-
lumination, which make it possible to tracelessly obtain
the full secret key [10]. The protocol with limited clas-
sical Bob who is limited not using the detectors may be
secure against this implementation-dependent attack. So
it is more secure to realize and be favored in some specific
applications. Last, the semi-quantum key distribution
protocols [3–5] are usually nondeterministic, i.e., Alice
can encode a classical bit into a quantum state, which is
then sent to Bob, but she cannot determine the bit value
that Bob will finally decode. But such nondeterministic
communication can be used to establish a shared secret
key between Alice and Bob, just as done in quantum key
distribution protocol. However, the protocol with limited
classical Bob can also be used to deterministically send
2message through quantum channel, which is also known
as quantum secure direct communication [11].
In this paper, we present two QKD protocols with lim-
ited classical Bob, and they also allow secure direct com-
munication. Furthermore, we prove that all the protocols
are completely robust. Robustness of a protocol means
that any adversarial attempt to learn some information
on the key necessarily induces some disturbance [3]. To
prove a protocol being robust is an important step in
studying security, and Boyer et al [3] particularly divided
robustness into three classes: completely robust, partly
robust and completely nonrobust. A protocol is said to
be completely robust if nonzero information acquired by
Eve on the INFO string (before Alice and Bob perform
the ECC step) implies nonzero probability that the legit-
imate participants find errors on the bits tested by the
protocol. A protocol is said to be partly robust if Eve
can acquire some limited information on the INFO string
without inducing any error on the bits tested by the pro-
tocol. A protocol is said to be completely nonrobust if
Eve can acquire the INFO string without inducing any
error on the bits tested by the protocol. Partly robust
protocols could still be secure, yet completely nonrobust
protocols are automatically proven insecure [3]. As one
example in Ref. [3], BB84 is completely robust when
qubits are used by Alice and Bob but it is only partly ro-
bust if photon pulses are used and sometimes two-photon
pulses are sent.
This paper is organized as follows. In sec. II and sec.
III, we present two QKD protocols with limited classical
Bob. In section. IV, a quantum secure direct commu-
nication protocol is proposed. And finally, we give the
conclusion.
II. SQKD PROTOCOL IN WHICH ALICE SENDS
FOUR QUANTUM STATES TO LIMITED
CLASSICAL BOB
We follow the BKM2007 protocol’s idea[3] to construct
an SQKD protocol described in the following, but the
classical Bob is restricted to performing only operation
(2) or doing nothing.
SQKD Protocol 1: Alice sends four quantum states
to limited classical Bob
Let the integer n be the desired length of the INFO
string, and let δ > 0 be some fixed parameter.
(1) Alice randomly creates N = 8n(1 + δ) qubits,
each of which is either in the computational (”Z”) ba-
sis {|0〉, |1〉} or in the diagonal (”X”) basis {|+〉, |−〉},
where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). And Al-
ice sends the N qubits to Bob. After Alice sends the first
qubit, she sends a qubit only after receiving the previous
one [3].
(2) When each qubit arriving, Bob chooses randomly
either to reflect it (CTRL) or randomly prepare a fresh
qubit in the classical basis and resend it (SIFT). Bob
resends a qubit immediately after receiving it.
(3) Alice measures each qubit in the basis she sent it.
(4) Alice announces which were her Z bits and Bob
publishes which ones he chose to SIFT. It expected that
approximate N
4
bits, Alice used the Z basis for trans-
mitting and Bob chose to SIFT; these are the SIFT bits,
which form the sifted key. They abort the protocol if the
number of SIFT bits is less than 2n; this happens with
exponentially small probability.
(5) Alice checks the error rate on the CTRL bits
(CTRL bits denote the bits produced by the process that
Bob chooses to CTRL). If either the Z − CTRL (Alice
used the Z basis and Bob chose CTRL) error rate or
the X − CTRL (Alice used the X basis and Bob chose
CTRL) error rate is higher than some predefined thresh-
old PCTRL, she and Bob abort the protocol.
(6) Bob chooses at random n sifted key to be TEST
bits. He publishes which are the chosen bits. Alice pub-
lishes the value of these TEST bits. Bob check the error
rate on the TEST bits and if it is higher than some pre-
defined threshold PTEST , they abort the protocol.
(7) Alice and Bob select the first n remaining sifted
key to be used as INFO bits (INFO string).
(8) Bob announces error correction code (ECC) and
privacy amplification (PA) data; he and Alice use them
to extract the m-bit final key from the n-bit INFO string.
Theorem .1 The SQKD Protocol 1 is completely robust.
Proof The difference between this protocol and
BKM2007 protocol is that for the process of SIFT, no
measurement is made and a fresh qubit is randomly pre-
pared in the classical basis, whereas a fresh qubit is pre-
pared in the classical basis according to the measure-
ment result in the BKM2007 protocol. However, the fresh
qubits are prepared in a random manner in both cases.
The security of BKM2007 is assured by means of Alice
and Bob checking the error rate of CTRL bits and TEST
bits. In fact the proof of complete robustness of SQKD
Protocol 1 is identical to that in the BKM2007 protocol.
Because the BKM2007 has been proven completely ro-
bust [3], the complete robustness of SQKD Protocol 1 is
assured.
III. SQKD PROTOCOL IN WHICH ALICE
SENDS ONLY ONE QUANTUM STATE TO
LIMITED CLASSICAL BOB
In 2009, a nice extension of BKM2007 was suggested
by Zou et al. [5], which suggests that it is sufficient for the
originator of the states (the person holding the quantum
technology) to generate just one state. We call such a
3protocol ZQLWL2009 for short. Fortunately we can also
follow the ZQLWL2009’s idea of SQKD to construct an
SQKD protocol with limited classical Bob in which Alice
sends only one quantum state described as follows.
SQKD Protocol 2: Alice sends one quantum state to
limited classical Bob
(1) Alice creates and sends N qubits |+〉N , where N =
8n(1+δ), n be the desired length of the INFO string, and
δ > 0 be a fixed parameter. After Alice sends the first
qubit, she sends a qubit only after receiving the previous
one.
(2) When each qubit arriving, Bob chooses randomly
either to reflect it (CTRL) or randomly prepare a fresh
qubit in the classical basis and resend it (SIFT). Bob
resends a qubit immediately after receiving it.
(3) Alice randomly measures each qubit either in the
Z basis or in the X basis.
It is expected that for approximately N
4
bits, Bob
chooses to SIFT and Alice measures in the Z basis; these
are the SIFT bits, which form the sifted key. For approx-
imately N
4
bits, Bob chooses to CTRL and Alice measure
in the X basis; we refer to these bits as CTRL−X .
(4) Alice announces which basis she chooses to measure
the qubits and Bob publishes which ones he chose to
SIFT. They check the number of sifted key. They abort
the protocol if the number of sifted key is less than 2n.
(5) Alice checks the error rate on the CTRL−X . If the
error rate of CTRL−X is higher than some predefined
threshold Pt, she and Bob abort the protocol.
(6) Bob chooses at random n sifted key to be TEST
bits. He publishes which are the chosen bits. Alice pub-
lishes the value of these TEST bits. Bob checks the error
rate on the TEST bits and if it is higher than some pre-
defined threshold PTEST , the protocol abort.
(7) Alice and Bob select the first n remaining sifted
key to be used as INFO bits.
(8) Bob announces ECC and PA data; he and Alice
use them to extract the m-bit final key from the n-bit
INFO string.
Theorem .2 The SQKD Protocol 2 is completely robust.
Proof It is similar to the proof of complete robustness
of the protocol in Ref. [7].
IV. QUANTUM SECURE DIRECT
COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL WITH
LIMITED CLASSICAL BOB
One might see a new feature in our protocol (with lim-
ited classical Bob) over some protocols (for example, [3])
in the fact that the bits are not random but can be cho-
sen deterministically by classical Bob. Having this prop-
erties, the protocol is not restricted to key distribution
only; it can be used for quantum secure direct communi-
cation [11], which is the direct communication of secret
messages without first producing a shared secret key.
At first glance, it seems to be a simple work to con-
stitute a quantum secure direct communication (QSDC)
protocol following the idea of SQKD protocol with lim-
ited classical Bob. However, it is completely insecure
because Eve can steal the secret message with man-in-
the-middle attack strategy. Eve stores all the qubits com-
ing back from classical Bob and resends randomly forged
qubits to Alice. After Bob announces which qubit he
chose to SIFT, Eve measures qubits of SIFT in the com-
putational basis and obtains the secret message. Fortu-
nately, the method used in Ref. [12] can be used in our
protocol to against the man-in-the-middle attack, and
quantum register is used. Let us give an explicit descrip-
tion of the protocol as follows.
(1) Alice and Bob agree that |0〉 and |1〉 represent 0
and 1 respectively.
(2) In order to transmit a message of some length n,
Bob constructs a longer string: some extra bits are used
for estimating the error rate (hence, the maximal infor-
mation eavesdropped by Eve) and some for redundancy,
which is used (via block coding) to encode the n-bit mes-
sage. We denote the longer string as m for convenience,
and the length of m is |m|. Bob notices Alice that he
wants to send a secret message to her.
(3) Alice generates random N = 2|m|(1 + δ) qubits
either in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} or in the di-
agonal basis {|+〉, |−〉}, and she sends them to classical
Bob. After Alice sends the first qubit, she sends a qubit
only after receiving the previous one.
(4) When each qubit arriving, Bob chooses randomly
either to reflect it (CTRL) or prepare a fresh qubit in the
classical basis according to the message m and resend it
(SIFT). Bob resends a qubit immediately after receiving
it.
(5) Alice uses an N -qubit register to save all qubits
coming back from Bob.
(6) After verifying that Alice has received all N qubits,
Bob announces which ones he chose to SIFT.
(7) Alice measures each qubit of CTRL in the basis
she sent it and each qubit of SIFT in the computational
basis. She checks the error rate on the CTRL bits. If
either the Z − CTRL (Alice used the Z basis and Bob
chose CTRL) error rate or the X−CTRL (Alice used the
X basis and Bob chose CTRL) error rate is higher than
some predefined threshold PCTRL, she and Bob abort the
protocol.
(8) Bob tells Alice which bits were used for error esti-
mation on the SIFT bits. If Alice, estimating the error
rate, detects Eve, she prevents public announcement of
the block-coding function by informing Bob. Thus the
4secret message can be transmitted with an exponentially
small probability of errors and exponentially small infor-
mation leakage.
Theorem .3 The QSDC protocol with limited classical
Bob is completely robust.
Proof It is straightforward by the proof of SQDK Pro-
tocol 1 that Alice can get the longer string m securely. If
Eve uses the man-in-the-middle attack described above,
Alice estimating the error rate in the step (8), will detect
Eve, and she informs Bob. Then Bob will stop public
announcement of the block-coding function. Eve won’t
get the n-bit message without knowing the block-coding
function.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented two QKD protocols with
limited classical Bob who performs only limited classi-
cal operations (preparing a (fresh) qubit in the classical
basis and send it or doing nothing) and proved its ro-
bustness. The presented two protocols have the feature
that the bits can be chosen deterministically by classical
Bob. Using this feature, we also constructed a quantum
secure direct communication. These give a new answer to
how much ”quantumness” is required in order to perform
classically impossible tasks in general [3].
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